Clark: International Law and Resources

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Lorne S. Clark*
I.

INTRODUCTION

We Canadians consider that there is no more significant aspect
of our national interest than control over, and development of, our
natural resources. This is partly because Canada has a greater percentage of its resources owned by foreign corporations than any
other industrialized nation in the world. 1 It is therefore not surprising that we share at least some of the views enunciated by the
majority of developing nations in the international community
-most of which have been granted their independence in the
post-World War IT period-on important matters such as regulation of foreign investment and the exercise of jurisdiction over the
exploration and exploitation of natural resources.
In company with these emerging countries, Canada does not yet
have the domestic financial means to exploit our resources without
the importation of investment capital from abroad. Despite our reliance on outside investment, Canada, unlike the developing nations,
has one of the highest standards of living in the world, a high level
of education, and is clearly an industrialized society with increasing
proportions of secondary and tertiary economic activity.
Being both developed and developing, Canada holds a unique
position. We tend to view international legal initiatives in the field
of natural resources with a perspective different from many states,
which have more of a vested interest in the arguments put forward
by either the capital-exporting or the capital-importing nations.
II.

DEVELOPMENTS BY THE UNITED NATIONS

A. Development of the Principle of "Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources"

The central forum for discussion of this subject by members of
the world community has been the United Nations. Initially, the
dialogue at the United Nations was concerned with the question of
"permanent sovereignty over natural resources." This issue was first
* B.A. McGill University; LL.B. University of London; Counsellor, Canadian Embassy,
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raised during the ~ebates on human rights in 1952. 2 At that time,
the world organization was concerned with the formulation of principles of self-determination in connection with the human rights
Covenants then being elaborated. In this context, permanent sovereignty over natural wealth emerged as an attribute of the principle
of economic self-determination.
For reasons that can be readily appreciated, this concept
quickly became enmeshed with the subject of colonialism, the headline item of the day (and an inevitable development in the early
1950's). The U.N. discussions at that time led to polarization between the developing, capital-importing states, with support from
the Eastern European bloc, and the developed, capital-exporting
nations. This polarization is a good example of the linkage between
international legal aspects of natural resource ownership and development, on the one hand, and relevant international political implications, on the other. Both must be taken into account when considering the matter from other than a strictly national point of view.
The Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) eventually adopted Resolution 523 3 of January 12, 1952,
concerning economic development in general and commercial agreements in particular. Of special interest is one of the clauses in the
preamble:
Considering that the under-developed countries have the right to
determine freely the use of their natural resources and that they
must utilize such resources in order to be in a better position to
further the realization of their plans of economic development
4

and an operative clause which
{r]ecommends that Members of the United Nations, within the
framework of their general economic policy, should

(b) Consider the possibility of facilitating through commercial
agreements:
(ii) The development of natural resources . . . .
provided that such commercial agreements shall not contain economic or political conditions violating the sovereign rights of the
2. See, e.g., 6 U.N. GAOR 501-20 (1952).
3. Integrated Economic Development and Commercial Agreements, G.A. Res. 523, 6
U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 20, U.N. Doc. N2119 (1952).
4. Id.
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underdeveloped countries, including the right to determine their
own plans for economic development. 5

Following further debates, on December 21, 1952, the Seventh
Session of the UNGA adopted the landmark Resolution 626 entitled
Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources, which affirmed the right of Member States "freely to use and exploit their
natural wealth and resources wherever deemed desirable by them
for their own progress and economic development . . . ." 6
The Ninth Session of the UNGA further refined the concept of
permanent sovereignty in its Resolution 837 of December 14, 1954,
which
[r]equests the Commission on Human Rights to complete its rec-

ommendations concerning international respect for the right of peoples and nations to self-determination, including recommendations
concerning their permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth
and resources, having due regard to the rights and duties of States
under international law and to the importance of encouraging international co-operation in the economic development of underdeveloped countries . . . .7

The important debate on whether a nation's permanent sovereignty over its resources was to be qualified in any way by the rights
and obligations of states under international law was taken up again
at the Thirteenth Session of the UNGA. At that time, Resolution
1314 of December 12, 1958 was adopted, establishing a nine-member
Commission to
conduct a full survey of the status of this basic constituent of the
right to self-determination . . . [including] the status of the permanent sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth
and resources . . . .8

The Commission met for the first time in May 1959. Its deliberations, the discussions in the Economic and Social Council, and
debates in the UNGA, especially those at the Seventeenth Session
in 1962, eventually led to the adoption on December 14, 1962 of the
5. Id. ~ 1.
6. G.A. Res. 626, ~ 1, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 18, U.N. Doc. N2361 (1952).
7. Recommendations Concerning International Respect for the Right of Peoples and
Nations to Self-determination, G.A. Res. 837, ~ 1, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 21, U.N. Doc.
N2890 (1954).
8. G.A. Res. 1314, ~ l, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 27, U.N. Doc. N4090 (1958) .
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Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources
(Declaration). 9
The Declaration positively reaffirms four basic principles of
international law: (1) compensation must be paid in the event of a
lawful taking of rights and property; (2) such compensation must
be paid in accordance with international law, that is, it must meet
international legal standards; (3) arbitration agreements between
states and private parties have a binding effect; 10 and (4) investment agreements between states and private parties have a binding
effect. 11
It is useful to note the objective of the Declaration: it endeavors
to determine the nature of the right of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources, the manner in which that right should be exercised, and what measures should be taken into account in accordance with international law.
UNGA resolutions are not, in themselves, binding under international law. 12 However, the Declaration seeks to enshrine the rights
of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural
wealth and resources. It is the considered view of many international lawyers that the Declaration, far from creating new law,
merely reaffirms existing international law. 13
After more than a decade of discussion and debate, it was clear
that, with the adoption of the 1962 Declaration, the world community recognized and accepted as a principle of international law
9. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1962).
10. Id. ~ 4. Paragraph 4 of the Resolution also states the prevailing view concerning
nationalization as of 1962, and merits quoting in full:
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or
reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as
overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such
cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules
in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in
accordance with international law. In any case where the question of compensation
gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking such measures
shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other parties
concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration or international adjudication .
11. Id. ~ 8.
12. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW or NATIONS 110 (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963).
13. See, e.g., Gess, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 13 lNT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 398, 409 (1964); Schwebel, The Story of the U.N. 's Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A.J. 463, 469 (1963); Vicuna, Some International Law
Problems Posed by the Nationalization of the Copper Industry by Chile, 67 AM. J. lNT'L L.
711, 712 (1973).
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that natural resources are the property of the state in the territory
in which they are found, or come under the jurisdiction of the state
upon which certain rights have been bestowed as a result of international agreement. 14
B. "Economic Rights and Duties of States" and "A New
International Economic Order"

Exactly one decade after the adoption of the Declaration on
Permanent Sovereignty, U .N. activity in the area of natural resource control resumed with even greater intensity. The United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
adopted Resolution 45(1II) 15 on May 18, 1972, which called for agreement on generally accepted norms to govern international economic
relations in a systematic manner. The Resolution underscored the
need for protection of the rights of all countries, especially the developing nations, and established a Working Group to begin drafting
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (Charter). 16 On
December 19, 1972, the UNGA agreed on the composition of the
Working Group of governmental experts.17 The following year, the
Working Group was urged by the Assembly to complete, as the first
step in the process of codification and development, a final draft
Charter to be considered and approved at the Twenty-ninth Session
of the UNGA in 1974. 18
In May 1974, the Sixth Special Session of the UNGA adopted
two resolutions, a Declaration and a Programme of Action on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order. 19 These resolutions emphasized that the proposed Charter was to constitute an
effective instrument for moving towards the organization of a new
system of international economic relations based on equity, sovereign equality, and interdependence of the interests of developed and
developing countries.
I will not address myself to the lengthy, complex, and at times
14. See, e.g., Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, art. 2, [1964] 1
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964).
15. UN CTAD Res. 45(Ill), 1 Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, 3 UNCTAD, Annex lA, at 58, U.N. Doc. TD/180 (1972).
16. Id. ~ 1.
17. G.A. Res. 3037, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 53, U.N. Doc. N8730 (1972). This
Resolution enlarged the Working Group from 31 to 40 members.
18. G.A. Res. 3082, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 40, U.N. Doc. N9030 (1973).
19. G.A. Res . 3201, 3202, 6 Special Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. 1, at 3, 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974).
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convoluted negotiations, discussions, and debates which finally resulted in Resolution 3281 of December 12, 1974, which adopted the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. 20 These have been
dealt with in detail by a number of eminent international lawyers
in recent publications. 21 Suffice it to say that during the elaboration
of the Charter the international political implications of the subject
in many ways overshadowed the relevant international legal aspects, much as the colonialism issue had adversely affected the
initial consideration of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the early 1950's. On the final roll call vote in the UNGA,
the Charter Resolution passed by a vote of 120 to 6 (including the
United States), with 10 abstentions (including Canada). 22 A degree
of polarization on substance remains, although a great deal of effort
was expended at the final meeting of the Working Group and in the
UNGA in an attempt to negotiate a text acceptable to all Member
States.
Much of the Charter language did receive unanimous support.
The provisions which did not secure general approbation, however,
deal with: (1) the treatment of foreign investment, (2) international
trade policy, and (3) development assistance policy. 23 Of these three
areas, the most controversial and the one of most interest to us in
reviewing natural resource law is the treatment of foreign investment, including the control of foreign-based multinational corporations and permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
In examining some of the difficulties, it should be noted that
the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Order,
which expanded upon the 1962 Permanent Sovereignty Declaration,
had asserted the "[f]ull permanent sovereignty of every State over
its natural resources and all economic activities." 24 Article 2, para20. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
21. See, e.g., Brower & Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A
Refiection or Rejection of International Law?, 9 INT'L LAW. 295 (1975); Lillich, Economic
Coercion and the International Economic Order, 51 INT'L AFF. 358 (1975).
22. The six negative votes were cast by Denmark, West Germany, Luxembourg, United
Kingdom, United States, and Belgium. The abstaining nations were Austria, Canada,
France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain. 29 U.N. GAOR
44-45, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2315 (1974).
23. G.A. Res. 3281, arts. 2, 4, 6, 8, 14, 22; 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (197 4). For the text of the final draft of the Resolution by the Second Committee, the
proposed amendments, and the votes thereon, see U.N. Docs. A/C.2/L.1386, 1398-1415, 1419,
reprinted in 29 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 48, at 1-31, U.N. Doc. A/9946 (1974).
24. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res.
3201, ~ 4(3), 6 Special Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. 1, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
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graph 1 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
purports to extend the application of the "permanent sovereignty"
concept to ,·'all [a state's] wealth, natural resources and economic
activities. " 25 The absence of any provision limiting the territorial
application of this concept permits the interpretation that a state
which transfers a portion of its wealth abroad, for example in the
form of foreign investment, still retains "permanent sovereignty"
over that wealth. This would conflict with the "permanent sovereignty" of the host state over its "economic activities." The Charter
provision can thus be read as internally inconsistent. Efforts to
introduce into the text some limitation of the concept of permanent
sovereignty, originally put forward in the context of control over
foreign-owned natural resources, were not successful. 26
Article 2, paragraph 2(a) asserts the right of every state "[t]o
regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its
national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations,"
and provides further that "[n]o State shall be compelled to grant
preferential treatment to foreign investment. " 27 While Canada did
not advocate preferential treatment for foreign investment, we did
take the view that
when a host State takes measures against foreign investment, it
should not discriminate against Canadian foreign investment in relation to foreign investment from other sources, and the measures
which it applies to all foreign investment should be in accordance
with its international obligations. 28

The issues of nationalization and compensation dealt with in
Article 2, paragraph 2(c) 29 proved to be incapable of a generally acceptable solution. Article 2 states:
2.

Every State has the right:

(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign
property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by
the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant
laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers
25. G.A. Res. 3281, art. 2, ~ 1, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
26. See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
27. G.A. Res. 3281, art. 2, ~ 2(a), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
28. 29 U.N . GAOR 56, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2315 (1974). See also 29 U.N. GAOR, C.2, 1649th
meeting 446, ~ 44, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/SR.1649 (1974).
29. G.A. Res. 3281, art. 2, ~ 2(c), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
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pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise
to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the
nationalizing State and by its tribunals unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be
sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means. 30

This position raises most clearly the fundamental issue of the relationship of international law to the treatment of foreign investment.
The Canadian position was that not only the right of nationalization
was conditioned upon payment of compensation, but that the whole
of Article 2 was inherently defective because of the absence of any
reference to the applicabilty of international law. 31 After the attempt by a group of 14 developed states, including Canada, to secure agreement on a substitute provision was voted down, 32 the Canadian representative in the General Assembly stated:
The reason my delegation attaches such importance to this point is
that, if we are to achieve and maintain the equitable distribution
of the world's wealth which this charter is intended to promote, a
significant flow of private capital from developed to developing
countries in the form of investment will be required. This movement
of capital will take place only in conditions which provide at least a
certain degree of security-which cannot possibly exist if the rule of
law is rejected. 33

The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States cannot,
as had been originally hoped, take its place alongside the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 194834 and the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the
United Nations of 197035 as expressing a consensus of the international community. However, it cannot be denied that the document
30. Id.
31. 29 U.N. GAOR 57, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2315 (1974). See also 29 U.N. GAOR, C.2, 1649th
meeting 446, ~~ 46-47, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/SR.1649 (1974).
32. For the text of the substitute Article 2, see U.N. Doc. A/C.2/L.1404, reprinted in 29
U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 48, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/9946 (1974). Article 2, paragraph 3 of the substitute was voted down by 71 against, 20 in favor, 18 abstaining; while
Article 2, paragraphs 1, 2 were defeated by 87 against, 19 in favor, 11 abstaining. Id. at 10.
33. 29 U.N . GAOR 58, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2315 (1974).
34. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
35. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
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is nevertheless an important milestone in the rapidly evolving
framework of economic relations between the developed and developing countries. The position asserted in the Charter concerning the
relationship of international law to foreign investment is therefore
most unfortunate.
However, it is still possible that the need to attract foreign
investment capital as part of the economic development process will
give rise to state practice, at least with respect to future investment,
so as to reassert the fundamental role of international law in this
area. Whether such state practice will reestablish the erstwhile
classical concept of equitable and effective compensation, as determined by international dispute settlement machinery dealing with
nationalization, is perhaps more problematical.
From my remarks you will have noted that, from a Canadian
point of view, U .N. developments in the field of sovereignty over
natural resources and foreign investment have been less than fully
satisfactory. U.N. Declarations and Charters may be debated, elaborated, and voted on, but as long as there is no universal organization with binding legislative authority, and the nation-state remains
the quintessential subject of the international legal order, municipal
or national law, relevant treaties and other agreements, and customary international law will govern.
C.

The Conference on International Economic Cooperation

In looking ahead to future developments, there is a need to keep
in view the North-South Dialogue, which is being conducted in
Paris. The Conference on International Economic Cooperation
(CIEC) 36 is a one-year attempt on the part of 27 industrialized and
developing countries to explore approaches to the problems of energy and to refine further the "New International Economic Order"
through energizing or stimulating action in such organizations as
UNCTAD, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the Food and
Agricultural Organization. This initiative is seen by participating
states, including Canada, as a unique opportunity to address the
various demands recently put forward by the developing countries
36. The work of the CIEC is discussed at 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 388-94 (1976) . The
General Assembly has requested U .N. organizations to actively assist the participants in the
CIEC. G.A. Res. 3515, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. 34, at 70, U.N. Doc. N10034 (1975).
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for changes in the world's economic system.
The CIEC is not an international lawmaking forum, but is the
embodiment of an exercise in considerable political will, and as such
can be expected to influence future international law in several
areas. Its limited but representative membership will tend to ensure
that any consensus reached in the Conference will be broadly acceptable to the international community at large. This may also
make it possible to replace the highly politicized and often sterile
debates on international economic problems with a more pragmatic
and systematic approach to these complex questions, which cannot
be resolved by mere rhetoric.
Of particular relevance to the subject before us is the Commission on Raw Materials, one of four Commissions within the CIEC.
This Commission has the responsibility of reviewing the progress
made in other international forums. It has been entrusted with facilitating the establishment of reenforcement of arrangements which
may seem advisable in the field of raw materials (including foodstuffs), which are of particular interest to developing countries. 37
It should be emphasized that the four Commissions do not
operate in isolation. The other three-on energy, development, and
financial affairs-might well take up resource issues from such other
perspectives as trade policy, technology assistance for development
of resources, or the implications for the emerging international economic structure. International economic relations have not been
static since the adoption of the Economic Charter in 1974 and the
holding of the last two Special Sessions of the U .N. General Assembly.
III.
A.

THE CANADIAN DOMESTIC RESPONSE

The Foreign Investment Review Act

In Canada, the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) 38 and its
attendant regulatory system are of critical relevance. The background to, and workings of, this new system were discussed by eminent experts at another panel here this morning. It might, however,
be helpful to reiterate some pertinent details. The first phase of the
FIRA was proclaimed in force on April 9, 197 4; the second phase
came into force on October 15, 1975. Foreign investment in Canada
37 . Memorandums for the Preparatory Meeting for the Conference of International Economic Cooperation, October 13, 1975, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS, 390-91 (1976).
38. Foreign Investment Review Act, Can. Stat. c. 46 (1973).
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therefore is now operating in the new climate of regulation created
by this important statute.
The key applicable principle is that foreign-controlled businesses in Canada should operate in ways that bring "significant
benefit" to Canada. 39 To this end they are expected to pursue policies which foster their independence from the head office in their
decision-making and enhance their innovative and other entrepreneurial capabilities, their efficiency, and their identification with
Canada and the needs and aspirations of the Canadian people. It
should be made clear that Canada is not in any way trying to discourage foreign enterprises, multinational or otherwise, from investing in our country. On the contrary, as has been emphasized, Canada continues to require capital importation to sustain our high
level of industrialization and our standard of living. However, our
central concern is that investment be of significant benefit to Canada.
By the end of 1973, cumulative direct foreign investment in
Canada totaled $32.8 billion. 40 Despite our much smaller population, this figure is 79 percent greater than the $18.3 billion of cumulative direct foreign investment in the United States at the end of
1973. 41
The FIRA requires the Canadian government to review proposed foreign investment in new businesses and anticipated expansion of existing foreign-controlled firms into unrelated areas. Of the
initial 230 applications reviewed, only 12 were disallowed, while 17
were withdrawn. 42 The first Annual Report on the operation of FIRA
highlights a number of benefits to Canada accruing from the new
screening process: 7,000 new jobs, over $500 million in new investment, increased exports, more purchases of Canadian goods and
services, improved efficiency and technology, strengthened research
and development, and a greater variety of goods and services produced in Canada. 43
In looking at these beneficial effects of the operation of FIRA,
it must be borne in mind that, on the resource side, three-quarters
39. Id. § 2.
40. Statistics Canada Daily, Sept. 30, 1975, at 2. Of this total, $25.5 billion, or 78
percent, came from U.S. investors. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1976
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 828, table 1396.
41. 1976 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 40, at 829, table 1398.
Of this total, $4.0 billion, or 22 percent, came from Canadian investors. Id.
42. [1974-75) FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV. AGENCY ANN. REP. 23 (1975).
43. Id. at 1.
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of the Canadian oil and natural gas industry 44 and about two-thirds
of the Canadian mining and smelting industry remain under nonresident control. 45 If these figures are to stay that high, the trade-offs
in "significant benefits" to Canada will also have to be substantial.
B.

Petro-Canada

On January 1, 1976, our new national petroleum company,
Petro-Canada, officially went into business. 46 Although oil interests
in the United States are well represented by private petroleum
companies (the "seven sisters" have been the subject of no little
publicity since the 1973 oil embargo), more than a dozen nations
have chosen to have their hydrocarbon interests managed by wholly
or partially owned national corporations.47 We are hopeful that
Petro-Canada can provide similar benefits for us. Meanwhile, British Petroleum, Ltd., which is nearly half-owned by the British
government, has about 15 percent of the market in Canada's two
largest provinces, Ontario and Quebec. Should we not be able to
compete with such companies on even terms in our own country?
IV.

CONCLUSION: CANADIAN VIEWS IN PERSPECTIVE

While we are examining national control over resources, economic rights and duties of states, and a new, emerging resource and
economic nationalism in Canada, care must be taken to put the
Canadian case into perspective. Our boisterous, self-congratulatory
centennial celebrations in 1967 (with its highlight, Expo '67 in Montreal) marked not only a period of festivity but also a national reawakening. Over the previous 100 years we were a relatively open
country-open to trade, to foreign ownership, and to investment.
Investment, mainly from the United Kingdom in the early years,
then primarily from the United States, was a central factor in our
development as a nation. 48
Confederation in 1867 found Canada with a tiny population on
a vast land mass. In order to harness and exploit the abundant
natural resources, a nationwide railroad and communications net44. GRAY REPORT, supra note 1, at 19, 20.
45. Id.
46. Petro-Canada was created by the Petro-Canada Act, Can. Stat. c. 61 (1975).
47. The most notable of these are, of course, the 13 members of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela .
48. GRAY REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
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work was required. Yet, after more than a century of development
the majority of Canada's resource industries are still foreignowned.49 A heightened awareness of the extent of nonresident economic domination has been coupled with a growing appreciation on
the part of Canadians that Canada is by no means a limitless storehouse of natural wealth awaiting only the drill, oil rig, or mine shaft.
At the same time, there is developing an increasing consciousness about the land itself, and of the responsibility to future generations for the stewardship of its resources and the environment. Most
Canadians have always had an attachment to and fascination with
the unspoiled wilderness around them. An hour by car from any city
in Canada will take one to lakes, rivers, forests, or mountains.
Pressures have grown to regulate land ownership, especially
ownership of recreational property, by non-Canadians and even by
nonresidents of particular provinces, so that speculative investment
does not distort land values and create social strains, and to avoid
a situation where Canadians will not have access to the choicest
property in our own country. 50 The land is of course the most precious of natural resources, and several provinces in Canada have
legislated to regulate its disposition in the interests of their people, 51
while others have the issue under careful study.
In both Canada and the United States, the finite nature of our
resource inheritance is increasingly appreciated, and this has raised
similar concerns about availability in relation to national needs. In
Canada this realization is matched by a desire to improve the economic benefit to Canadians from the export of our nonrenewable
resources. We are now seeking to take fuller advantage of opportunities for refining, processing, and manufacturing in our own country.
We can no longer welcome trading propositions in which access to
our major markets for finished goods is sought, while tariffs are
erected by our trading partners to discourage Canadian raw material exports, except in the most unprocessed form. Thus we look to
the current Geneva negotiations of the Tokyo Round of the GATI
for changes in tariff and nontariff barriers which will give Canada a
fairer opportunity to process and manufacture her own products in
Canada where it is economical to do so.
But whether financing comes from domestic or foreign sources,
49. Id. at 224.
50. See, e.g., Bruce, Land Grab, MACLEAN's, May 1975, at 25.
51. See, e.g., Land Transfer Tax Act of 1974, Ont. Stat. c. 8 (1974).
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Canada is not looking for unrestricted growth and environmental
havoc. The public hearings held to consider the effects on the fragile
northern ecology of the construction of a pipeline to bring Canadian
Arctic gas to southern markets underscored this concern. There is
also serious public concern about the hazards of supertanker traffic
through the coastal waters of the three oceans which surround Canada.52 This is particularly true of the Pacific coast, where the risks
of a major oil spill in the waters off British Columbia from tankers
bringing Alaskan oil into Puget Sound continue to cause apprehension. Bilateral and multilateral efforts to develop comprehensive
environmental protection regimes must be encouraged and promoted so as to provide a viable international legal basis for preserving such ecologically sensitive areas.
In concluding these remarks, which have dealt with only some
of the significant aspects of the subject under examination, it is
appropriate to note that natural resource law, as it is emerging in
national legal systems and in the context of the existing and future
international legal order, is indeed a fascinating area for study and
research. Its importance cannot be exaggerated. The almost overwhelming task of enhancing current knowledge and expertise is a
challenge to which international lawyers can and will rise, to the
benefit of their own countries and to the credit of their profession.
1

52. This concern was manifested by the passage of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, CAN. R.Ev. STAT., 1st Supp., c. 2 (1970).
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